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Abstract
We introduce an integer programming formulation for a class of combinatorial optimization
games, which includes many interesting problems on graphs. Based on the theorem, proved in
our previous paper [6], that the core is nonempty if and only if the associated linear program
has an integer optimal solution, we prove some duality properties between related $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$
linear programs for the $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}-\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$games to be totally balanced.
1 Introduction
Game theory has a profound influence on methodologies of many different branches of sciences,
especially those of economics, operations research and management sciences. The concept of core
[22] lays down an important principle for a collective decision: Every subgroup of the players
would not be able to do better if they break away from the decision of all players and form
their own coalition. In addition, the thesis of bounded rationality is introduced as a crucial
concept for game theoretical solutions to have practically meanful implementations in real life
situations [25, 18, 21]. Informally, this states that players would not spend an unbounded amount
of computational resources to gain a small amount of improvements in the outcome. There have
been more and more studies on the computational aspects of game theory problems, though
early works may even be traced back to two decades ago [15, 11, 20, 5, 21, 9, 17]. An extensive
discussion can be found in a review by Kalai on interplays of operations research, game theories,
and theoretical computer science [12].
Games associated with combinatorial optimization have long attracted the attention of re-
searchers. An important feature of these games is that the value of each subset of players can
be presented succinctly as the optimal solution to a combinatorial optimalization sub-problem
for these players. Shapley and Shubik studied a market in which players start with a vector for
the amount of commodities they own and wish to redistribute the commodities so as to maxi-
mize their utility functions [23]. Shapley and Shubik also studied an assignment game for which
whether an imputation is in the core can be tested efficiently [24]. Claus and Kleitman initiated
the discussion of the cost allocation problem of communication networks shared by many users
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and introduced several cost allocation criteria [3]. Bird [1], and independently, Claus and Gra-
not [2] formulated it as a minimum cost spanning tree game (a terminology coined by Granot and
Huberman [11] $)$ . Megiddo introduced an alternative formulation with Steiner trees [16]. Tamir
studied a traveling salesman cost allocation game [26], and network synthesis games [27]. Deng
and Papadimitriou discussed a game for which the game value for any subset of players is the
total weight of the edges in the subgraph induced by them [5]. Faigle, et al., studied an Euclidean
TSP game and a matching game $[8, 9]$ . Nagamochi, et al., studied a minimum base game on
matroid [17].
In another direction, Owen introduced a linear production game in which each player $j$ controls
a certain resource vector $\dot{\mathcal{U}}[19]$ . Jointly, they maximize a linear objective function $cx$ , subject to
the resource constraints $Ax \leq\sum_{allj}\dot{\nu}$ . The value a subset $S$ of players can achieve on their own
is the maximum they can achieve with resources collectively owned by this subset: $\max\{cX:A_{X}\leq$
$\sum_{j\in S}\dot{\nu}\}$ . Dubey and Shapley studied games related to some nonlinear programs which result in
totally balanced games, that is, games for which cores of subgames are all nonempty [7]. Kalai
and Zemel considered a class of combinatorial optimization game associated with the maximum
flow from a source to a sink on a network, where each player controls one arc in the network
$[13, 14]$ . The maximum flow game is totally balanced, and on the other hand, every non-negative
totally balanced game is a maximum flow game $[13, 14]$ . Curiel proved that the class of linear
programming games is equivalent to the class of totally balanced games [4]. These reductions for
the equivalence proof, however, involve in exponential time and space in the number of players [4].
Therefore, complexity for computational problems for the cores of these models are not necessarily
the same.
The motivation of our study is to design a general model which allows for general mathemat-
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}/\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ methods to deal with computational issues for combinatorial optimization
games. In this paper, we focus on a class of combinatorial optimization games with their game
values defined by the following integer programs of packing type, $\max\{y^{t}1$ : $y^{t}A\leq 1^{t},y\geq$
$0,y$ integral}, and of covering type $\min${ $1^{t}x$ : $Ax\geq 1,$ $x\geq 0,$ $x$ integral}, where matrix A is of 0-1
values and vector 1 is of all ones. We showed in [6] that the core for such a game is nonempty
if and only if the corresponding linear programming relaxation has an integer optimal solution.
This result opens the door for techniques central to combinatorial optimization problems to be
applied to our cooperative game problems. Based on this, we show in this paper tight results
in terms of totally balanced games, which reveals an asymmetry between the games of packing
type and the games of covering type: The total balancedness of a packing game implies that the
corresponding covering game has nonempty core, while the total balancedness of a covering game
implies that the corresponding packing game is also totally balanced.
In Section 5, we study the above relation between packing and covering games for the the
maximum matching game and the vertex-cover games on graphs. In this case, we see that one of
them is totally balanced if and only if the other is totally balanced, and this occurs if and only
if the underlying graph is bipartite.
2 Packing and Covering Games
For a cooperative game $(N, v)$ , we have a set $N$ of players, and a value function $v$ : $2^{S}arrow R$ : for
each subset $S\subseteq N$ of players, $\mathrm{v}(\mathrm{S})$ is the revenue the subset can obtain by forming a coalition of
the players in $S$ only. The question is how to distribute the total value $v(N)$ to the players, i.e.,
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to find an imputation $x$ : $Narrow R_{+}$ such that $\sum_{i\in N}x(i)=v(N)$ . Usually we denote $\sum_{i\in S}x(i)$
by $x(S)$ . Then, the above condition can be written as $x(N)=v(N)$ . The concept of core
introduces a principle to resolve this problem. An imputation $x$ is in the core if and only if
$\forall S\subseteq N$ : $x(S)\geq v(S)$ . That is, no subset of players can gain advantage by breaking away from
the collective decision and forming their own coalition. The above formulation works only for
the revenue distribution problem. For cost allocation, the definitions is similar with the above
inequalities in the reversed direction.
In this paper, we are interested in the following special subc.lass of combinatorial optim.ization
games: i.e., packing and covering games. We restrict $A$ to be an $m\cross n\{0,1\}$-matrix. Let $1_{k}$ and
$0_{k}$ denote the column vectors with all ones and all zeros, respectively, of dimen.sion $k$ . We may
denote these vectors by 1 and $0$ for simplicity. Let $M=\{1,2, \cdots, m\}$ and $N=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ be
the $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\dot{\mathrm{r}}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ index sets, and $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathrm{t}}t$ denote the transposition operation. $\mathrm{C}\dot{\mathrm{o}}$nsider the following
linear program,
$LP(c, A, \max)$ : $\max$ $y^{t}c$
$s.t$ . $y^{t}A\leq 1_{n}^{t}$ , $y\geq 0_{7rb}$ ,
and its dual,
$DLP(C, A, \max)$ : $\min$ $1_{n}^{t}x$
$s.t$ . $Ax\geq c$ , $x\geq 0_{n}$ ,
where $c$ is an $m$-dimensional column vector $\in R^{m},$ $y$ is an $m$-dimensional column vector of
variables and $x$ is an $n$-dimensional column vector of variables.
We denote the corresponding integer programming version of $LP(c, A, \max)$ by $ILP(C, A, \max)$ .
Since $A$ is a $\{0,1\}$-matrix, the integrality constraints are equivalent to require $y$ to have $\{0,1\}$
values. We define the packing game Game $(C, A, \max)$ as follows, where $\overline{S}=N-S$ :
1. The player set is $N$ .
2. For each subset $S\subseteq N,$ $v(S)$ is defined as the value of the following integer program:
$\max$ $y^{t}c$
$s.t$ . $y^{t}A_{M,S}\leq 1_{|S|}^{t}$ , $y^{t}A_{M},\leq\overline{s}\mathrm{o}_{n}^{t}-|s|$ ’
$y\in\{0,1\}^{m}$ ,
where $A_{T,S}$ is the submatrix of $A$ with row set $T$ and column set $S$ , and $v(\emptyset)$ is defined to be $0$ .
Since this is a maximization problem, we may as well assume that $c_{j}>0$ for $j.$
.
with $A_{j}$ . $\neq 0$ .
Otherwise, we can always choose $y_{j}=0$ .
We then introduce a covering game Game $(d,A, \min)$ for cost minimization problems in the
similar manner:
1. The player set is $M$ .
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2. For each subset $T\subseteq M,$ $v(T)$ is $\mathrm{d},\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ as the value of the following integer program:
$\min$ $d^{t}x$
$s.t$ . $A_{T,N^{X}}\geq 1_{|T|}$ , $x\in\{0,1\}^{n}$ ,
where $v(\emptyset)$ is defined to be $0$ .
Again we can assume $d_{j}>0$ for all $j$ . Otherwise we may always choose $x_{j}=1$ to simplify
the problem. Since the value of the game is defined by a solution to the minimization problem,
this is in $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}_{\vee}\mathrm{t}$ a problem of $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\sim \mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ the cost of the game. Thus, we would revise the definitions
of imputation and core. A vector $w$ : $Marrow R_{+}$ is an imputation if $w(M)=v(M)$ , and an
$\mathrm{i}\tilde{\mathrm{m}}$putation is in the core if $w(T)\leq v(T)$ holds for all $T\subseteq M$ .
We note at this point that two games Game$(c, A, \max)$ and Game$(d, A, \min)$ with $c=d$ are
not dual in the sense of the underlying linear programs since the roles of objective function and
the right hand side of the constraint are not interchanged. In the case of $c=d=1$ , however, the
corresponding linear relaxations become dual to each other.
3 Properties of the Core
In this section, we describe several mathematical theorems for the core of $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}/\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$
games, which were given in [6].
Lemma 1 A vector $z$ : $Narrow R_{+}$ is in the core of Game$(C, A, \max)$ if and only if
1. $z(N)=v(N)$ ( $i.e.,$ $z$ is an imputation),
2. $z(s_{i})\geq c_{\dot{l}}$ for all $i\in M$ , where $S_{i}=\{j\in N|A_{ij}=1\}(i.e.,$ $z$ is feasible to the dual
$DLP(C, A, \max)$ of $LP(C, A, \max))$ .
Theorem 1 The core for Game$(c,A, \max)$ is nonempty if and only if $LP(C, A, \max)$ has an
integer optimal solution. In such case, a vector $z$ : $Narrow R_{+}$ is in the core if and only if it is an
optimal solution to $DLP(C, A, \max)$ .
Similarly, we have the following lemma and theorem for the minimization game.
Lemma 2 A vector $w$ : $Marrow R_{+}$ is in the core of Game $(d, A, \min)$ if and only if
1. $w(M)=v(M)$ ( $i.e.,$ $w$ is an imputation),
2. $w(T_{j})\leq d_{j}$ for all $j\in N$ , where $T_{j}=.\{i\in M|A_{ij}=1\}.(i.e.,$ $z$. is feasible to the dual
$DLP(d,A, \min)$ of $LP(d,A, \min))$ .
Theorem 2 The core for Game$(d,A, \min)$ is nonempty if and only if $LP(d,A, \min)$ has an
integer optimal solution. In such case, a vector $w$ : $Marrow R_{+}$ is in the core if and only if it is an
optimal solution to $DLP(d, A, \min)$ .
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4 Duality Properties for Totally Balanced Games
For a game with set of players $N$ and game value $v$ : $2^{N}arrow R_{+}$ , the game with a subset $S$ of
players with $\emptyset\neq S\subseteq N$ and the game value $v_{S}(S/)=v(S’)$ for all $S’\subseteq S$ is called the subgame
induced by $S$ . A game is called totally balanced if any of its subgames has nonempty core [13].
In this section, we discuss the relationship of the total balancedness between Game$(1m’ A, \max)$
and Game$(1n’ A, \min)$ .
Given a packing game Game$(c, A, \max)$ , a subset $S\subseteq N$ of players induces the following
subgame:
1. The player set is $S$ .
2. For each subset $S’\subseteq S$ , the game value $vs(s’)$ is defined as the value of the following integer
program:
$\max$ $y^{t}c$
$s.t$ . $y^{t}A_{M,S}’\leq 1_{|S’}^{t}|$ ’ $y^{t}A_{M,N-S}’\leq 0_{n-|}^{t}S’|$ ’
$y\in\{0,1\}^{m}$ .
By noting that constraint $y^{t}A_{M,N-S}\leq 0_{n-|s|}^{t}$ is always implied for any $S’\subseteq S$, we see that the
subgame is equivalent to the packing game Game $(c \sigma, A_{U,s},\max)$ , where $U=\{i\in M|A_{ij}=$
$0$ , for all $j\in N-S$}.
Similarly for a covering game Game$(d,A, \min)$ , a subset $T\subseteq M$ of players induces the following
subgame:
1. The player set is $T$ .
2. For each subset $T’\subseteq T,$ $v_{T}(T’)$ is defined as $\mathrm{t}\dot{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{e}$ value of the following integer program:
$\min$ $d^{t}x$
$s.t$ . $A_{T’,N^{X}}\geq 1_{|T|}’$ , $x\in\{\mathrm{o}, 1\}^{n}$ .
Clearly, this subgame is equivalent to the covering game Game $(d,A_{T,N}, \min)$ . In this case, if
Game$(d,A, \min)$ is totally balanced, so is Game$(d, A_{T,N}, \min)$ .
Theorem 3 If Game $(1_{m}, A, \max)$ is totally balanced, then the core for Game $(1_{n},A, \min)$ is
nonempty.
$\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{O}}\mathrm{f}\cdot$. Since Game$(1m’ A, \max)$ is totally balanced, it has a nonempty core. Therefore, by
Theorem 1, the following linear program has an integer optimal solution $y^{*}$ .
$LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ : $\max$ $y^{t}1_{m}$
$s.t$ . $y^{t}A\leq 1_{n}^{t}$ , $y\geq 0_{m}$ .
Without loss of generality, assume $y_{1}^{*}=y_{2}^{*}=\cdots=y_{r}^{*}=1$ and $y_{r+1}^{*}=y_{r+2}^{*}=\cdots=y_{m}^{*}=0$ . We
can rearrange the columns of $A$ so that $A_{11}=A_{12}=\cdots=A_{1p}=1$ and $A_{1(p1}+$ ) $=A_{1(p2}+$ ) $=$
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$...=A_{1n}=0$ . Then, by the feasibility of $y^{*}$ , all entries in the submatrix $A_{\{2,\ldots,r\},\{}1,\ldots,p$} are
zeros.
Consider the following linear programs for $1\leq k\leq p$ :
$LP_{k}$ : $\max$ . $y^{t}1_{m}$
$s.t$ . $y^{t}A\leq 1_{n}^{t}$ , $y^{t}A_{k}.\leq 0$ , $y\geq 0_{m}$ ,
which correspond to the subgames Game $(1_{m}, A_{M},N- \{k\}’\max)$ , and let $y^{k*}$ be their optimal solu-
tions. By the total balancedness, $1_{m}^{t}y^{k*}$ are integers which are at least $1_{m}^{t}y^{*}-1$ , for all $k$ (since
a vector $y\in\{0,1\}^{n}$ such that $y_{1}=0$ and $y_{i}=y_{i}^{*}$ for all $i\neq 1$ is a feasible solution to $LP_{k}$ ).
We now claim that $1_{m}^{t}y^{k*}=1_{m}^{t}y^{*}-1$ holds for at least one $k$ . Assume not, and we will have
$1_{m}^{t}y^{k*}=1_{m}^{t}y^{*},$ $k=1,2,$ $\cdots,p$ . Let $y’= \frac{1}{p}[(1,0, \cdots, 0)t+\sum_{k=1}^{\mathrm{p}}y^{k*}]$ . Then for $p+1\leq j\leq n$ ,
$(y’)^{t}A_{j}.= \frac{1}{p}(k\sum_{1=}^{p}yk*A.j)\leq 1$ .
For $1\leq j\leq p$ , we have $(y^{j*})^{t}A_{j}.\leq 0$ and $(y^{k*})^{t}A_{j}.\leq 1$ for all $k\in\{1,2, \ldots ,p\}-\{j\}$ . Since
$(1, 0, \cdots, \mathrm{O})A_{j}.=1$ , this implies $(y^{/})^{t}A_{j}.\leq 1$ for all $j=1,2,$ $\cdots$ , $n$ . Therefore, $y’$ is a feasible
solution to $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ , but $1_{m}^{t}y’=1_{m}^{t}y^{*}+ \frac{1}{p}$ , a contradiction to the optimality of $y^{*}$ .
Based on this claim, we prove that $LP(1_{m}, A, \min)$ also has an integer optimal solution by
induction on the number $n$ of columns of $A$ (which proves by Theorem 2 that Game $(1_{n}, A \min)$
has nonempty core). For the base case of $n=1,\ddot{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ matrix $A$ must be a vector of all ones, since
otherwise, $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ is unbounded. Then $x_{1}=1$ is the optimal solution for $LP(1_{1},A, \min)$ ,
which is an integer solution.
For general $n$ , let $x^{*}$ be the optimal solution of $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ . By the above claim, we may
assume without loss of generality that $1_{m}^{t}y^{1*}=1_{m}^{t}y^{*}-1$ . Let $S=N-\{1\}$ and $T=\{i\in M|$
$A_{i1}=0\}$ . It is easy to see that the linear program $LP_{1}$ and its dual $DLP_{1}$ can be written as
follows.
$LP_{1}$ : $\max$ $y_{T}^{t}1_{||}T$
$s.t$ . $y_{T}^{t}A_{T,S}\leq 1_{n-1}^{t}$ , $y\tau\geq 0_{||}T$ .
$DLP_{1}$ : $\min$ $1_{|S|^{x}}^{t}s$
$s.t$ . $A_{T,S^{X}S}\geq 1|\tau|$ , $xs\geq 0_{1}S|$ .
Since $c_{ame}(1_{m}, A, \max)$ is totally balanced, Game $(1_{1}S|’ AT,s, \max)$ is totally balanced and has a
nonempty core. Thus, by Theorem 1, we have an integer optimal solution $y_{T}^{0}$ to $LP_{1}$ . By induction
hypothesis, we also have an integer optimal solution $x_{S}^{0}$ to $DLP_{1}$ . Define $w\in\{0,1\}^{n}$ by $w_{1}=1$
and $w_{j}=(X_{S}^{0})_{j}$ for $j\in S$ . Then $A_{T,N^{W}}=A_{T,S^{X_{S}}}0\geq 1_{|T|}$ and $A_{M-T,N^{W}}=1_{|M-T|}+A_{M-\tau,s}X^{0}\tau\geq$
$1_{|M-T|}$ . Therefore $w$ is a feasible integer solution to $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ , and furthermore,
$1_{n}^{t}w=1+1_{|S|^{x}s}^{t0}=1+1_{|T|}^{t}y_{\tau}^{0}=1+1_{m}^{t}y^{1*}=1_{m}^{t}y^{*}$ ( $=\mathrm{o}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$ value of $LP(1_{m},$ $A, \max)$ )
implies that it is an optimal solution to $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ by the duality theory of linear program-
ming. By Theorem 2, therefore, the core for Game $(1n’ A, \min)$ is nonempty. $\square$
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We remark in passing that a weaker condition such as only the nonempty core for Game $(1_{m}, A, \max)$
would not give the same result: The following matrix $A$ has a nonempty core for Game$(16, A, \max)$
but the core for Game$(14, A, \min)$ is empty.
$A=[_{1}^{0}0011$ $000111$ $000111$ $000111]$
To see this, first note that $y^{*}=(1,0,0, \mathrm{o}, 0,1)^{t}$ and $x^{*}=(1/2,1/2,1/2,1/2)^{t}$ are optimal solu-
tions to $LP(1_{6}, A, \max)$ and $LP(1_{4}, A, \min)$ , respectively, because they satisfy the complementary
slackness condition of linear programming. Since $y^{*}$ is integer, Game $(1_{6}, A, \max)$ has a nonempty
core by Theorem 1. However, $LP(1_{4},A, \min)$ cannot have an integer optimal solution $x$ whose
entries consist of two ones and two zeros, because, for any choice of two entries, the corresponding
entries in some row of $A$ are zeros. Then, by Theorem 2, the core for Game$(14, A, \min)$ is empty.
In addition, a stronger result that Game $(1n’ A, \min)$ is totally balanced would not hold either:
The following matrix $A$ gives a totally balanced game Game $(1_{6}, A, \max)$ but Game$(13, A, \min)$
is not totally balanced.
$A=$
This can be seen as follows. First note that $A$ contains $3\cross 3$ identity matrix. For any choice
of a subset $S\subseteq N=\{1,2,3\}$ , it is easy to see that $y^{*}$ with $y_{i^{*}}=1$ for $i\in S$ and $y_{i}^{*}=0$ for other
$i$ is an optimal solution to $LP(1_{6}, A, \max)$ . Hence, by Theorem 1, Game $(1_{6}, A, \max)$ is totally
balanced. However, for $T=\{4,5,6\}\subseteq M=\{1, \ldots, 6\},$ $LP(1_{3}, AT,N, \min)$ has the optimal value
3/2, and hence no integer optimal solution.
Surprisingly, for the opposite direction, a stronger result holds, as will be stated in Theorem 4.
First we prove the next lemma, which is similar to Theorem 3 but requires a somewhat different
proof.
Lemma 3 If Game $(1_{n}, A, \min)$ is totally balanced, then the core for Game$(1m’ A, \max)$ is non-
empty.
Proof: To prove that the core of Game$(1m’ A, \max)$ is nonempty, we only have to show by
Theorem 1 that $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ has an integer optimal solution.
We prove this by induction on the number $m$ of rows of $A$ . The base case $m=1$ is trivial,
since there is only one variable $y_{1}$ in $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ and $y_{1}=1$ is an integer optimal solution to
the problem. We then prove the general case of $m>1$ on the premise that it is true for $m-1$ .
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Let $x^{*}$ be any integer optimal solution of $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ . Denote by $A^{i}$ the submatrix of $A$
excluding the i-th row $A_{i}.$ , and let $x^{i*}$ be an optimal solution for $LP(1_{n}, A^{i}, \min)$ , where $m\geq 2$ .
Clearly, for each $i=1,2,$ $\ldots,$ $m,$ $1_{n}^{t}x^{*}-1\leq 1_{n^{X}}^{ti*}\leq 1_{n}^{t}x^{*}$ and $A_{i^{X^{*}}}.\geq 1$ hold. We now show that
there is an integer optimal solution to $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ , as this completes the proof by Theorem 1,
by considering the following three cases.
Case-l: $1^{t_{X}i*}=1^{t}x^{*}$ for some $i\in\{1,2, \ldots, m\}$ . This implies that $LP(1_{n}, A^{i}, \min)$ and
$LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ have the same optimum value. Since Game $(1_{n},A, \min)$ is totally balanced,
Game$(1_{n}, A^{i}, \min)$ is also totally balanced. By inductive hypothesis, $LP(1_{m-1}, Ai, \max)$ has
an integer optimal solution $\hat{y}$ : $(M-\{i\})arrow\{0,1\}$ , which can be extended to a feasible solution
$\hat{y}$ : $Marrow\{0,1\}$ of $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ by assigning $\hat{y}_{i}=0$ for this $i$ . Since $LP(1_{n},A^{i}, \min)$ has the
same objective value as $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ , this $\hat{y}\in\{0,1\}^{m}$ is an optimal solution for $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$
which is integer.
Case-2: $A_{i^{X^{*}}}.>1$ holds for some $i\in\{1,2, \ldots,m\}$ . We show that $x^{*}$ is also an integer optimal
solution to $LP(1_{n},A^{i}, \min)$ for such $i$ . Let $y^{*}$ be an optimal solution to $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ , and
$y^{i*}$ be obtained from $y^{*}$ by removing its i-th component $y_{i}^{*}$ . Clearly, $x^{*}$ (resp., $y^{i*}$ ) is feasible
to $LP(1_{n}, A^{i}, \min)$ (resp., its dual, $LP(1_{m-1},$ $A^{i},$ $\max)$ ). Since $A_{i^{X^{*}}}.>1$ implies $y_{i}^{*}=0$ by
complementary slackness of linear programming, it follows that $1_{m-1}^{t}y^{i*}=1_{m}^{t}y^{*}=1_{n}^{t}x^{*}$ . Thus,
$x^{*}$ and $y^{\dot{2}*}$ are optimal solutions to $LP(1_{n}, A^{i}, \min)$ and its dual, respectively, and $LP(1_{n}, A^{i}, \min)$
and $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ have the same optimum value. Then, we can apply the same argument as in
Case-l to show that $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ has an integer optimal solution.
Case-3: For any integer optimal solution $x^{*}$ to $LP(1_{n}, A, \min),$ $1_{n}^{t}x^{i*}=1_{n}^{t}x^{*}-1$ and $A_{i^{X^{*}}}.=$
$1$ hold for all $i=1,2,$ $\ldots,m$ . Now let $x^{*}$ be an integer optimal solution to $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ .
Renaming the indices if necessary, we may assume that $x_{1}^{*}=x_{2}^{*}=\cdots=x_{p}^{*}=1$ and $x_{p+1}^{*}=\cdots=$
$x_{n}^{*}=0$ . We will show below that $p=m$ and the submatrix $A_{M,\{1,\ldots,m\}}$ is the identity matrix.
Let $I(j)=\{i|A_{ij}=1\}$ for $j=1,2,$ $\ldots,n$ . Then $I(j)\neq\emptyset$ for all $j=1,$ $\ldots,p$ , since $x^{*}$ is an
optimal solution of $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ . Without loss of generality, we can permute the rows of $A$ so
that $A_{11}=1$ . We claim the following properties.
1. $\{I(1), I(2), \ldots,I(\mathrm{P})\}$ is a partition of the set $M$ .
2. For all $j$ with $2\leq j\leq p$ , we have $A_{1j}=0$ .
3. For all $i$ with $2\leq i\leq m$ , we have $A_{i1}=0$ .
From the assumption of Case-3, $Ax^{*}=1$ holds, which means that {I (1), $I(2),$ $\ldots,$ $I(p)$ } is a
partition of the set $M$ , i.e., property 1. Clearly, property 1 and $A_{11}=1$ imply property 2.
To show the property 3, we extend the optimal solution $x^{1*}$ of $LP(1_{n}, A^{1}, \min)$ to an integer
solution $x^{1\mathit{0}}$ of $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ by assigning $x_{1}^{1\mathit{0}}=1$ and $x_{j}^{1\mathit{0}}=x_{j}^{1*},$ $2\leq j\leq n$ . Clearly, $x^{1\mathit{0}}$
is feasible in $LP(1_{n},A, \min)$ , and $1_{n}^{t}x^{1\mathit{0}}\leq 1_{n}^{t}x^{1*}+1\leq 1_{n}^{t}x^{*}$ holds by the above assumption
$1_{n}^{t}x^{1*}\leq 1_{n}^{t}x^{*}-1$ of Case-3. Then, we see that $1_{n}^{t}x^{1\mathit{0}}=1_{n}^{t}x^{1*}+1=1_{n}^{t}x^{*}$ and $x_{1}^{1*}=0$ must
hold. Therefore, $x_{1}^{1\mathit{0}}$ is an integer optimal solution of $LP(1_{n}, A, \min)$ , and we can assume that
$A_{X^{1\mathit{0}}}=1$ holds (otherwise, Case-2 can be applied to this $x^{1\mathit{0}}$ ), from which $\{I(j)|x_{j}^{1\mathit{0}}=1\}$ is a
partition of $M$ . By the feasibility of $x^{*1}$ , we have $\bigcup_{x_{j}^{1*}=}I1(j)=M-\{1\},$ and $\bigcup_{x_{j}^{1*}=}I1(j)$ is also
a partition of $M-\{1\}$ (since $\{I(j)|x_{j}^{1\mathit{0}}=1\}$ is a partition of $M$). Therefore, $x_{1}^{1*}=0$ implies
that $I(1)-\{1\}=\emptyset$ (otherwise, for an $i\in I(1)-\{1\},$ $A_{1^{X^{1*}}}.=0$ would result). This proves
property 3.
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By applying this to other indices $j$ with $2\leq j\leq p$ , we see that the j-th column $A_{j}$. contains
exactly one nonzero entry for each $j=1,$ $\ldots,p$ . From this and property 1, we have $p=m$ and
hence $A_{M,\{1,\ldots,m\}}$ is the identity matrix.
This property and the fact that $x^{*}$ is an optimal solution of $LP(1, A, \min)$ imply that every
column $A_{j}$. for $m<j\leq n$ also contains at most one nonzero entry. Therefore, the vector $y^{*}=1_{m}$
is feasible, and hence, optimal to $LP(1_{m}, A, \max)$ . $\square$
The condition that Game$(1,A, \min)$ is totally balanced cannot be relaxed to the nonemptiness
of the core of Game $(1,A, \min)$ as shown by the following example.
$A=$
To see this, first note that $y^{*}=(1/2,1/2,1/2,1/2)^{t}$ and $x^{*}=(1,0,0,\mathrm{o},0,1)^{t}$ are optimal solu-
tions to $LP(1_{4}, A, \max)$ and $LP(1_{6}, A, \min)$ , respectively, because they satisfy the complementary
slackness condition of linear programming. Since $x^{*}$ is integer, Game $(1_{6}, A, \min)$ has a nonempty
core by Theorem 2. However, $LP(1_{4}, A, \max)$ cannot have an integer optimal solution $x$ whose
entries consist of two ones and two zeros, because, for any choice of two entries, the corresponding
entries in some row of $A$ are ones. Then, by Theorem 1, the core for Game $(1_{4},A, \max)$ is empty.
However, we can make the conclusion stronger.
Theorem 4 If Game$(1An” \min)$ is totally balanced, then Game$(1m’ A, \max)$ is also totally bal-
anced.
Proof: To show that Game$(1_{m}, A, \max)$ is totally balanced, it is enough to show that the
following linear programs have integer optimal solutions for all $S\subseteq N$ .
$\max$ $y^{t}1_{m}$
$s.t$ . $y^{tt}A_{M,S}\leq 1_{|S|}$ , $yA_{M,\overline{S}}t\leq \mathrm{o}tn-|s_{1}$ ,
$y\geq 0_{m}$ ,
where $\overline{S}=N-S$ . Let $T=$ {$i\in M|A_{ij}=0$ for all $j\in\overline{S}$}, $\overline{T}=M-T=\{i\in M|A_{ij}=$
$1$ for some $j\in\overline{S}$}. For this, consider the following linear program:
$LP(1_{|T|}, A_{T},s, \max)$ : $\max$ $y_{T}^{t}1_{|T|}$
$s.t$ . $y_{T|s_{1}}^{t}A_{T,S}\leq 1^{t}$ , $y\tau\geq 0_{||}T$ .
Given any optimal solution $y_{T}\in\{0,1\}^{1}T|$ to this linear program, the vector $y^{*}$ defined by $y_{i}^{*}=0$
for all $i\in\overline{T}$ and $y_{i}^{*}=(y\tau)_{i},$ $i\in T$ is an optimal solution tom $LP(1_{m}, A_{M},s, \max)$ . Therefore, it
is sufficient to show that $y_{T}$ can be chosen as an integer optimal solution. For this, consider its
dual $DLP(1_{1}T|’ A_{T,s,\max)}$ which is described as follows:
$LP(1_{|s|},AT,s, \min)$ : $\min$ $1_{|S|}^{t}x_{S}$
$s.t$ . $A_{T,S^{X}}s\geq 1_{|T|}^{t},$ $Xs\geq 0_{|S|}$ .
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This can be rewritten as follows, since $A_{T,\overline{S}}$ has all zero entries.
$LP(1_{n’\tau,N}A, \min)$ : $\min$ $1_{n}^{t}x$
$s.t$ . $A_{T,S^{X}}s+A_{T,\overline{S}^{X_{\overline{S}}}}\geq 1_{|T|}^{t}$ , $x\geq 0_{n}$ .
Since Game$(1n’ A, \min)$ is totally balanced, so is subgame Game$(1_{n}, AT,N, \min)$ . By Theorem 2
and Lemma 3, this implies that the following linear program has an integer optimal solution.
$LP(1_{|T|’ N}A_{T},, \max)$ : $\max$ $y_{\tau^{1}}^{t}|T|$
$s.t$ . $y_{TN}^{tt}A_{T},\leq 1_{n}$ , $y\tau\geq 0_{||}T$ .
Obviously, any feasible solution $y\tau$ to $LP(1_{|T}|’ A \tau,s,\max)$ is feasible to $LP(1_{|T|,N}A_{T},, \max)$ , since
$y^{t}TA_{T},\overline{S}\leq 1_{|\overline{S}|}^{t}$ is automatically satisfied by the fact that $A_{T,\overline{S}}$ is of all zero entries. This proves
that $LP(1_{|T|}, A \tau,s, \max)$ has an integer optimal solution. $\square$
5 Matching and Vertex Cover Games on Graphs
We shall now exemplify the duality properties between packing and covering games, proved in
the previous section, for a pair of games on a graph. Given a graph $G=(V, E)$ , the maximum
matching game has players on vertices and the game value $v(S)$ for $S\subseteq V$ defined by the
maximum matching size in the induced subgraph $G[S]$ . Similarly, the minimum vertex cover
game has players on edges and the game value $v(S)$ for $S\subseteq E$ defined by the size of a minimum
vertex cover in the subgraph $G[S]=$ (V, $S$). These games are formulated by packing game
Game$(1_{||}E,A, \max)$ and covering game Game$(1|V|’ A, \min)$ , respectively, where the constraint
matrix $A$ is the incidence matrix of $G$ in which rows correspond to edges $E$ and columns correspond
to vertices $V;A_{ij}=1$ if and only if edge $i$ and vertex $j$ are incident.
By Lemma 1, an imputation $z$ is in the core of the matching game if and only if $z(u)+z(u’)\geq 1$
holds for all edges $(u,u’)\in E$ . Based on this observation, we can easily find two classes of graphs
for which the cores are always nonempty: The class of graphs for which the size of a minimum
vertex cover is the same as the size of a maximum matching, and the class of graphs with a
perfect matching. For a graph $G=(V, E)$ in the first class, we assign $z(v)=1$ if $v$ is in the
minimum vertex cover and $z(v)=0$ otherwise. It is easy to see that this $z$ is indeed in the core.
For a graph $G=(V, E)$ in the second class, we assign every vertex $v\in V$ with $z(v)=0.5$ . Then
$z(V)=|V|/2=v(E)$ , since $G$ has a perfect matching. Furthermore, since the size of a maximum
matching in any subgraph $G[S]$ induced by $S\subseteq V$ is no more than $|S|/2$ , this $z$ is indeed in the
core.
Furthermore, one can easily construct other graphs with non-empty cores, which are not in
the above two classes. For example, take two graphs one from each of the above classes, and
connect them with edges between the vertices in the minimum cover and the vertices in the
perfect matching. However, the next theorem says that these are essentially all graphs which
have nonempty cores for the maximum matching game.
Theorem 5 An undirected graph $G=(V, E)$ has a nonempty core for the maximum matching
game if and only if there exists a subset $V_{1}\subseteq V$ such that
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1. the subgraph $G_{1}=G[V_{1}]$ induced by $V_{1}$ has a minimum vertex cover $W$ with the same size
$a\mathit{8}$ its maximum matching,
2. the subgraph $G_{2}=c[V-V_{1}]$ induced by $V-V_{1}$ has a perfect matching,
3. all the remaining edges $(u, u’)\in E$ between $G_{1}$ and $G_{2}$ satisfy $u\in W$ for the vertex cover
$W$ in 1.
By elaborating the proof of this theorem, we can also show the next corollary.
Corollary 1 The maximum matching game is totally balanced if and only if graph $G=(V, E)$
is bipartite.
In the minimum vertex cover game Game $(1_{1}V|’ A, \min)$ , the players are on edges and the value
of a subset $S\subseteq V$ is the minimum vertex cover in the induced subgraph $G[S]$ . The matrix $A$
for this game $\tilde{1}\mathrm{S}$ the same as the maximum matching game. By Lemma 2, an imputation is in
the core if and only if there is no vertex $u$ such that the sum of the imputation over the edges
incident with $u$ is more than one.
Theorem 6 The core for the minimum vertex cover game on graph $G=(V, E)$ is nonempty if
and only if the size of a maximum matching is equal to the size of a minimum vertex cover.
We note here that the condition in the above theorem holds if $G$ is a bipartite graph by $\mathrm{K}_{\ddot{\mathrm{O}}\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}’ \mathrm{s}$
theorem. The next corollary can also be proved by elaborating the proof of the above theorem.
Corollary 2 The minimum vertex cover game is totally balanced if and only if graph $G=(V, E)$
is bipartite.
It is now evident that Corollaries 1, 2 are consistent with the duality properties stated as
Theorems 3, 4 in Section 4.
6 Conclusion
Based on the previous results [6], we examined duality properties that hold between minimiza-
tion game and maximization game, and show some asymmetry in terms of totally baiancedness
in these games.
Many open problems result from our approach: Would our model help in study of other solution
concepts for cooperative games? Can these nice results about cores be extended to larger classes
of combinatorial optimization games? The mathematical formulation of many combinatorial
optimization games will be on hypergraphs instead of graphs. Can our methodology still work for
hypergraphs? One may observe that totally balanced games and balanced matrices are somewhat
related. Can we completely understand the relationship between totally balanced games and
balanced matrices for our model?
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